Ayer Says
This is Becks, and you are all are going to hate me. I can't help it. I would feel too guilty subjecting all my own regulars to this, and I know it will soon be replaced by the next installment of the gripping and somewhat racey tale being spun by the Kitten, which alleviates a bit of the guilt I feel after posting it here instead.
So, because this is "Thought for the Day", I give you some Ayer. Feel free to skip class today, of course. ;)
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With regard to ethics, Alfred Jules Ayer believes that those who ground morality on 'normative' principles, e.g. Utilitarianism, believe they are right to do so because these principles are fundamental (i.e., they know them to be true). In this instance, the principle of performing actions that �cause the greatest happiness, or greatest balance of pleasure over pain� (�right� actions) is held to be a foundational principle with which to judge the moral worth of actions. Utilitarians believe that �good� moral statements are 'significant' when grounded on the Principle of Utility.
However, Ayer believes problems arise when the principle of the �greatest balance of pleasure over pain� is thought to be an ethical fact. He writes, �It is not self-contradictory to say that some pleasant things are not good, or that some bad things are desired�. Here-here!
Ultimately, Ayer believes conflicts between ethical statements, based on the same 'normative' principles, cannot be reconciled. This is the basis for his Emotivist theory of ethics.
The key to understanding Ayer's critique of ethics is his belief that ethical statements are NOT facts! Ayer writes:
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not saying anything more than if I had simply said, 'You stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks.
For Ayer, to state �Stealing money is wrong� has no factual meaning. By using the Principle of Utility as an example, we can see how he arrives at this conclusion:
1. The principle of the �greatest balance of pleasure over pain� means �Stealing money is wrong� because the person who was robbed will suffer.
2. The principle of the �greatest balance of pleasure over pain� means �Stealing money is NOT wrong� because the person who steals the money is poor and will suffer without money to buy food.
If either of these was a factual proposition, then either would be true (or false). However, they contradict each other. Both statements are based on the Principle of Utility, but both are suggesting drastically different ethical 'facts' about the nature of stealing. If either of these statements was an ethical 'fact', then it should, in theory, be able to verify which one is true (or not). If the notion of 'wrongness' had some factual content, then it would surely also add some �factual weight� to the issue. But it doesn�t. The �presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition�, in this case the phrase �is wrong� (or �is not wrong�), �adds nothing to its factual content�. By saying, �Stealing money is wrong� (or �Stealing money is not wrong�), one is only expressing a feeling or personal belief about stealing. There are no facts to debate in this instance. There is just a report of what one believes or feels to be the case.
A very simplistic understanding of Ayer's Emotivism would indicate that he believes moral statements have no meaningful function to them. That is, if moral statements have no factual content, then there is no point in ethical debate because no one can be morally right or wrong.
However, although Ayer argues that ethical statements lack factual content, he does not believe they have no meaningful function. He writes, �It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to express feeling. They are calculated to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action�.
Ayer believed there were persuasive elements in ethical language. Because of this, he also considered meaningful debate in moral issues to be possible. However, as far as Ayer was concerned, the basis of dispute was not due to a difference in fundamental beliefs but rather a misunderstanding concerning the facts. In any such dispute, one is simply faced with questions concerning what people believe, and why they hold such beliefs. These are the only 'facts' in any ethical dispute, and the only basis for any useful moral debate.
In criticizing Emotivism, one must keep in mind some key aspects related to it. Emotivism does not propose a methodology for making moral decisions but is simply an analysis of the nature and content of ethical language. Also, Emotivism begins with the assumption that ethical language is non-factual. Thus, Emotivism stands apart from ethical theories that propose factual content to ethical propositions. Emotivism removes all factual content from ethical language and does not discuss �ethical facts�.
Even with these distinctions in mind, Emotivists such as Ayer do have a problem to address when we consider the function of ethical language to be that of arousing feeling and stimulating action. At this point, Ayer is suggesting that ethical language is more than just an expression of feeling � that it has some 'normative' quality to it (this being one�s intention to stimulate others to act in a way one feel is right). But on what basis can Ayer justify the moral propositions he might use to stimulate other people into action? Why should one person's feelings about a matter be any more valid than another's? The question is not one of facts but one of authority. Just as a respected art-critic might not be expressing facts about what s/he feels about a painting, s/he is noted for having the authority to express her/his feelings about it. However, Ayer does not offer any potential reasons why one person's moral propositions should be used to stimulate action as opposed to another's. Essentially, he cannot. All Ayer can do is draw attention to the reasons why people have the different views they do. This overlooks a fundamental principle as to why people act the way they do � they do so because they believe they have good reasons.
Despite the Emotivist's suggestion that ethical language is non-factual, people do not act the way they do without good reason (in their own opinions, at least). To say people should only ever make decisions based on feelings seems an unsound basis for living. In particular, it would be very unwise to give people authority to direct our actions simply because they inspired some emotional response in us. Stephen A. Richards gives a great example � both Adolf Hitler and Martin Luther King gave very powerful and emotive speeches and stimulated many people to act. However, can we agree that both men were a source of moral inspiration simply because they aroused feelings and stimulated action? If we deny this, what are our reasons for doing so?
Posted by beckers-j
2007-02-22
go back | random brainstorm | go forth
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